INTRODUCTION
Report of the Petroleum
Revenue Special Task Force
We have
pleasure in reporting the conclusion of the assignment given to the Petroleum
Revenue Special Task Force (PRSTF) in accordance with its Terms of Reference as
laid out at the inauguration of the Task Force. We enclose our final report of
work done together with our key findings and recommendations.
Our
overall approach has been prescriptive and consultative with various stakeholder
groups within the Petroleum Industry providing in our estimation a unique
opportunity to address some long standing issues that affect the industry.
This is
our final report of the assignment. Accordingly, this report supersedes earlier
copies used for presentations and discussions.
We take
this opportunity to thank all the Government Agencies and Private Organisations
in the Petroleum Sector who assisted us by providing us with information and
documentation from the Operator’s records.
We appreciate
the opportunity given to us to be of service to the Ministry and the Nation on
this most important assignment.
Yours
faithfully,
Mallam
Nuhu Ribadu
Chairman,
PRSTF
Olasupo
Shasore SAN
Member/Secretary
-
Executive Summary
Background
The
Honourable Minister of Petroleum Resources, driven by the need to strengthen
the institutions responsible for Petroleum Revenue Management, commissioned the
Petroleum Revenue Special Task force (PRSTF) on 28
February
2012. The goal of the Task Force was to support the programme of the Federal
Government of Nigeria in enhancing optimization, probity and accountability in
the operations of the Petroleum Industry.
As part of
this agenda and the issues arising from the various fiscal regimes existing in the
sector, there arose an urgent need to establish the streams of revenue flows
from the Petroleum sector to the Federal Republic of Nigeria and design systems
and processes which would enhance the accountability of each agency or entity.
The
assignment of the Special Task Force is contained in its Terms of Reference and
covers the entire Petroleum Value Chain. Accordingly, the Task Force set out to
confirm if existing systems, laws, processes and functions across the value
chain provide reasonable assurance that revenues from the Petroleum Industry
are captured, complete, recorded intact, properly accounted for and that
revenue due is demanded and collected.
Terms of
Reference
At the
inauguration of the Petroleum Revenue Special Task Force, the following Terms
of Reference (ToR) were communicated:
1. To work
with consultants and experts to determine and verify all petroleum upstream and
downstream revenues (taxes, royalties, etc) due and payable to Federal
Government of Nigeria;
2. To take
all necessary steps to collect all debts due and owing; to obtain agreements
and enforce payment terms by all oil industry operators;
To design
a cross debt matrix between all Agencies and Parastatals of the Ministry of
Petroleum Resources;
4. To
develop an automated platform to enable effective tracking, monitoring and
online validation of income and debt drivers of all Parastatals and Agencies in
the Federal Ministry of Petroleum Resources;
5. To work
with world-class consultants to integrate systems and technology across the
production chain to determine and monitor crude oil production and exports,
ensuring at all times, the integrity of payments to the Federal Government of
Nigeria; and
6. To
submit monthly reports for ministerial review and further action.
Scope and Methodology
Since its
inauguration, members of the PRSTF have approached the assignment with all the
seriousness that it deserves. In carrying out its ToR, one of the initial
activities performed by the PRSTF was to obtain both written and verbal
presentations from the various stakeholder groups within the Petroleum
Industry. This was to enable the Task Force to understand the challenges faced
and the type of reforms that are required. This was all carried out with a view
to determining and optimising the nation s revenue streams from all sectors
within the industry.
The Task
Force members also visited and reviewed selected agencies and operators,
supported by the Consultants, for the period spanning 1 January 2005 to 31
December 2011 in line with the Statute of Limitations. Two workshops were also
held to aid information gathering process with respect to key issues of
Metering and Measurement in the Oil & Gas Sector Value Chain, and Security
in the Oil and Gas Sector.
Apart from
several plenary meetings to receive briefings, analyse gathered information and
deliberate on findings, the Task Force also operated through constituted two
(2) ad-hoc subcommittees to conduct a detailed review of NNPC s and DPR s roles
in petroleum revenue management.
Five (5)
standing subcommittees were also formed and conducted detailed assessments
followed with recommendations in specific areas relevant to the overall ToR.
Specifically in pursuance of ToR 2, the Task Force through the Security and
Enforcement Subcommittee also liaised with relevant agencies to validate the
status of outstanding debts identified in the course of the forensic review,
and to demand payments where deemed necessary.
Revenue
Review and Debt Verification Findings
The Task
Force in pursuance of ToR 1 and 2 conducted activities to determine and verify
all Petroleum Upstream and Downstream Revenues due and payable to Nigeria; and
took all necessary steps to collect all debts due and owing.
It was
determined that the main petroleum revenues due to the national treasury in
respect of oil and gas activities in Nigeria are:
Domestic
Crude Oil Sales, Equity Crude Oil Sales, Gas Sales, Refined Petroleum Products
sales, Profits from NNPC subsidiaries, Petroleum Profits Tax, Company Income
Tax, Signature Bonus, Concession Rentals, Royalties from Oil and Gas, Gas Flare
Penalties, and Miscellaneous Oil Revenues.
The Task
Force s key findings are presented below according to these revenue streams.
1.
Proceeds from the sale of Domestic Crude Oil
As at 31
December 2011, N843 million1 was due to the Federation in respect of Domestic
Crude Oil allocations. The amounts outstanding as at 31 December 2011 represent
amounts due for the months of September 2011 to December
2011. In
view of the 90-day credit period, the outstanding amount as at 31 December 2011
was not due for payment.
The Task
Force received representations from the NNPC and other relevant agencies on the
Corporation s practice of deducting amounts for subsidy-related expenses prior
to remittance of these revenues. In the course of the Task Force s work, we did
not receive sufficient justification for the practice which does not accord
with the law, with particular reference to the Constitution.
1 PRSTF is
aware that further settlement should now have reflected providing figures as at
April 2012
Our review
of the records received for 2002 to 2011 showed an inconsistent pattern in the
implementation of the policy to allocate 445,000bpd allocation to NNPC, with
variances found for the ten years reviewed.
The Task
Force also compared the average price per barrel payable by NNPC for Domestic
Crude with the average weekly prices for Nigeria Bonny Light, Forcados,
obtained from the Energy Information Administration (EIA). The review revealed
that over a 10 year period (2002 2011), the State may have been short paid by
an estimated sum of US$ 5 billion, although it was understood from discussions
with NNPC officials that the pricing of domestic crude oil was based on
international prices. Enquiries from NNPC revealed that up until October 2003,
NNPC was granted fixed price regimes which explain the wide disparity in prices
in the earlier years.
The Task
Force found that the exchange rates used in arriving at the Naira equivalent of
the amounts payable differed from the CBN rates for six (6) of the ten (10)
years reviewed. The potential underpayment of amounts payable to the Federation
Account over the 10- year period is estimated at N86.6 billion. Also, the Task
Force s review of the domestic crude utilisation showed that the percentage not
refined in- country ranged from between 50% to 88% over the 10 year period.
2. Proceeds
from Equity Crude Oil Sales:
Equity
Crude represents government s share of crude oil production (excluding domestic
crude) obtained mainly from three (3) arrangements: Joint Operating Agreements
(JOA) with IOCs, Production Sharing Contracts (PSC) and Service Contracts.
Equity Crude Oil proceeds are remitted into the Federation account as export
proceeds, DPR accounts as Royalties and FIRS accounts as Petroleum Profit Tax.
The Task
Force observed that there is no single point accountability for the income and
expenditure streams of upstream petroleum operations, compounded by the current
structure of NNPC such as multiple roles executed through NAPIMS and its COMD.
A decline
was also observed in national investments that would increase the nation s
proven reserves. Accordingly, despite the increase in crude oil production in
Nigeria over the years, the nation s entitlement has decreased as a result of
various alternative funding arrangements for its upstream investments.
The Task
Force found that legislation governing the industry and agreements with third
parties are outdated, do not reflect current economic or legal realities; or
include ambiguous clauses. Also, there are some provisions within the
legislation that could significantly improve government s revenue that the
government is yet to take advantage of. Examples include a provision to ensure
that the share of the Government of the Federation in the additional revenue
shall be adjusted under the Production Sharing Contracts if the price of crude
oil at any time exceeds $20 per barrel; and the requirement for a periodic
review of provisions in specified time frames.
It was
also observed that some traders lifted crude oil although they were not listed
on the approved master list of customers who had a valid contract and were
selected through an annual bidding process. The Task Force research also found
that quite a number of traders did not demonstrate renowned expertise in the
business of crude oil trading.
Furthermore,
the Task Force found that the use of crude oil traders was contrary to the
global trend wherein national oil companies develop their own trading arms,
such as the various NNPC trading subsidiaries which currently have limited
capacity. The Task Force identified various concerns in this area with Nigeria
being the world s only major oil producer that sells 100 percent of its crude
to private commodities traders, rather than directly to refineries. Various
submissions to the Task Force demonstrated the potential for lost margins to
middlemen, manipulation of pricing, suboptimal returns and market fraud as
emanating from this policy and practice.
A review
of NAPIMS s audited financial statements as at 31 December 2009 showed that
Joint Venture cash calls payable was N459.568billion. Since 2006, government
has not allocated enough funds to cover these amounts and NNPC has entered into
a range of borrowing arrangements referred to as Alternative Financing
Arrangements with the costs of financing this debt (estimated at around 8%)
continuously mounting. This cycle will continue to increase in the coming years
unless a systemic solution is found.
As JV
partners there is a need for the effective management and oversight of oil
companies operating costs which affects revenues accruable to Nigeria. There is
also a clear training, technology and human capacity gap between NAPIMS staff
and their counterparts in the private oil and gas sector.
3. Proceeds
from the Sale of the National Entitlement (Gas):
The Task
Force aided by the Consultants identified a total of N137.572 billion ($946.878
million) due to the Federation from SNEPCO representing the proceeds of gas
sales from the Bonga oil field; according to the NNPC (NAPIMS) Financial
Statements for the year ended 31 December 2009.
For
Liquefied Natural Gas, the price observed at which the feedstock gas is sold to
NLNG seems too generous, compared to prices obtainable on the international
market. The estimated cumulative of the deficit between value obtainable on the
international market and what is currently being obtained from NLNG, over the
10 year period, amounts to approximately US$29 billion.
4. Proceeds
from Sale of Petroleum Products:
From the
Task Force s review, NNPC is owed N27billion including current debt, total
overdue, disputed debt and total debt outstanding, by the major marketers of
petroleum products. We also found that amounts payable to suppliers of
petroleum products, as at 31 December 2011 amounts to approximately US$3.6
billion, of which US$2.7 billion represents amounts outstanding for over 365
days. The Task Force also observed that pipeline product loss has steadily
increased over the years.
5. NNPC
and Subsidiaries:
From
review of the latest available audited financial statements (2009) it was noted
that NNPC has sixteen (16) subsidiaries. The financial performance of the
Corporation and its subsidiaries in 2009 shows the Group had a deficit of
approximately N298billion for the period. Various reviews conducted by the Task
Force showed that the NNPC does not receive the required capital to grow its
assets or meet operating costs. NNPC has therefore increasingly relied on the
FGN for lines of credit, and deduction of oil revenue due to the Federation
Account. In our review, the legal basis for this practice was unclear.
6. Signature
Bonus:
The Task
Force found that discretionary decision-making in the award of oil blocks can
result in revenue losses for Nigeria. Our review also showed that the
management of past bid rounds has resulted in lower demand and fewer qualified
bidders, uncompleted deals weakened government returns, and lower development
of acreage.
The DPR
provided the task force with information indicating that 67 licenses were awarded
between 1 January 2005 and 31 December 2011; with an outstanding balance of
$566 million unpaid in signature bonuses. For the 7 discretionary allocations
reviewed, the Task Force found $183million outstanding and due to the nation s
treasury. We were however informed that of the total $749m outstanding in
signature bonuses, $321m was legally disputed.
7. Concession
Rentals:
The Task
Force found that $2.9million represents outstanding amounts to be collected by
the DPR from the various concessionaires. However, we also observed
inconsistencies in records provided by DPR in respect of information and
schedules regarding the list of concessions.
8.
Royalties (Crude Oil and Gas):
The Task
Force found that $3.027billion was outstanding from the operators for crude oil
royalties as at 31 December 2011 per the DPR s records. Of this amount, the DPR
had stipulated that ADDAX is liable to pay $1.5billion royalties under the 2003
fiscal regime and there is currently a dispute between Addax and NNPC on the
one hand, and the DPR on the other. In the course of the review, the Task Force
also encountered differences in records of payments made to the CBN vis- -vis
DPR records, and lack of independent gas production and sales data.
9. Gas Flare
Penalties:
The Task
Force found that the DPR is currently unable to independently track and measure
gas volumes produced and flared and depends largely on the information provided
by the operators.
We also
observed that the periodic reconciliation meetings with the operators to
address the gas flare volumes were delayed with only 6 completed of 36 at the
time of our review.
The total
revenue from gas flaring during the review period was $175million with the
balance outstanding as unpaid was approximately $58million indicating that
$115million had been received by the DPR. We however reviewed payments received
by the CBN in respect of gas flare penalties. However a review of CBN records
showed that $137million was received between 1 January 2005 and 31 December
2011. The DPR was not able to reconcile the $115 million to the $137million.
Lastly,
operators have not compiled with the recent Ministerial directive signed on 15
August 2011 increasing the gas penalty fee from N10.00 to $3.50. The operators
have continued to flare gas at the rate of N10 and records at the DPR reveal
that none of the companies have paid any gas penalty fee in 2012.
10.
Miscellaneous Oil Revenues:
The Task
Force was unable to obtain a comprehensive miscellaneous oil revenue schedule
from the officials of the DPR, although a review of CBN s records provided some
information albeit with unexplained variances. The amounts due in respect of
the various fees relating to the miscellaneous oil revenues are also not
reflective of the current economic realities.
Revenue
Losses in the Nigerian Petroleum Industry The Task Force identified sources of
revenue losses in the industry, with a view to identify opportunity areas for
major reform in boosting resources obtainable from the sector for national
development. These include the following.
1. Crude
Oil Theft and Associated Revenue Losses: Hydrocarbon theft was found by the
Task Force as being a major and chronic source of revenue loss to Nigeria.
Theft of crude oil and refined petroleum products may be reaching emergency levels
in Nigeria.
The Task
Force observed various estimates by International Oil Companies and Government
officials of the scale and volume of crude theft which ranged from 6 to 30
percent of production. While the Task Force does not endorse any of the numbers
it received, we note that it could actually be as high as 250,000 barrels per
day closer to 10% of daily productions amounting to as high as N1 trillion
annually. This issue therefore requires immediate attention.
2. Lost
Refined Products and Associated Revenue Losses
The Task
Force did not receive comprehensive figures documenting volumes of refined
products stolen or spilled. NNPC reports that thieves stole 3.2 million metric
tons of products from its pipeline network between 2001 and 2010 and that about
40 percent of products currently channelled through pipelines are lost to theft
and sabotage.
PPMC also
recorded 4,468 product pipeline breaks in 2011, 98 percent of them from
sabotage; and values the products stolen from its pipeline network between 2001
and 2010 at N178 billion.
3. NNPC
Withholdings for Costs Associated With Theft and Sabotage: NNPC withholds oil
revenues from the Federation Account to cover costs associated with theft and
pipeline sabotage.
4. Pioneer
Status granted to Indigenous Companies
The Task
Force was informed that at least five companies: Allied Energy, Midwestern Oil
& Gas, Brittania Oil Nigeria Limited, Suntrust Oil Company Nigeria Limited;
and Niger Delta Petroleum Resources Limited2 have been granted pioneer status
by the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission (with others pending or
undetected) for their exploration and production activities.
The Task Force finds
that the granting of pioneer status to oil operators for an activity that is
well established for over 40 years inappropriate. The loss of revenue from the
grant of pioneer status to oil operators is an avoidable loss and it is
recommended that any such further consideration be stopped forthwith and the
current ones set aside and or revoked.
1.Collateral
Social Costs of Theft:
The Task
Force also found that certain social costs emanated from crude oil theft and
considered them important and requiring urgent attention. These include
environmental
2 The
argument that the status is appropriate for exploration and not production is
untenable and self-defeating because once it is accepted that production is
already being carried on in Nigeria the same goes for exploration pollution and
its socioeconomic impacts, armed piracy, and lost investment in the sector leading
to revenue losses.
Debt
Collection
Based on
the detailed review of outstanding debts owed to the Federation, the Task Force
determined outstanding amounts for royalties, signature bonuses and concession
rentals. Pursuant to an initial understanding of ToR 2 of the PRSTF, relevant
government agencies were invited to assist in a debt collection drive, and
invitation and demand letters were sent to over 47 oil companies allegedly
indebted to the nation. We have recommended that government pursue debts
further in any manner deemed appropriate.
However
during the debt reconciliation exercise, the sum of USD$5,830,261 was paid into
the treasury of Government with evidence of payment, while several companies
made undertakings to pay at later dates.
Automation of
the Nigerian Petroleum Industry
The Task
Force identified Information Technology and business automation gaps, by
carrying out Current Position Assessments of the stakeholders within the Oil
and Gas production value chain, including government regulatory
parastatals.
The assessment scope covered three broad categories namely Core Business
Systems, Reporting Capabilities and Automation Capabilities of these entities.
Our
findings showed that there were evident automation gaps in the oil and gas
value chain specifically in key agencies under the Ministry of Petroleum
Resources/ Department of Petroleum Resources that are vested with the mandate
to produce Oil and Gas, licence, keep and update records, supervise petroleum
industry operations and ensure payment of rent and royalties.
Additionally,
the PRSTF reviewed the state of metering and measurement in Nigeria s oil and
gas value chain vis- -vis best practices. The challenges identified with the
current metering and measurement regime can be summarised as a lack of adequate
vision and ownership required to articulate and drive a cohesive implementation
of IT and Automation in MPR and DPR.
The Task
Force identified the following specific challenges with the metering and
measurement regime:
•
Dependence on manual data gathering processes
• Low
level infrastructure at remote locations
• Lack of
regular and systemic well testing
•
Inadequate data and IT infrastructure among industry players
•
Inadequate MIS reporting and dashboard capabilities in existing systems
•
Disparate systems with differing data, nomenclature among operators
• Diverse
data requirements from Government agencies
• Multiple
and strong stakeholders with divergent interests
The Task
Force also found inconsistent oil and gas data across the petroleum industry.
These inconsistencies in information were sighted across the major agencies and
parastatals of the MPR as well as with the oil and gas operators themselves.
Recommendations
In order
to address the findings and issues above, the Task
Force has
developed the following recommendations which Government should implement to
address the issues identified and their root causes.
1.
Strategic Management Recommendations
From a
strategic viewpoint of the Task Force s review and the findings discussed
above, the Task Force recommends the following:
• Set up a
process, independent of NNPC, to review the use of oil traders and NNPC s
system for selling crude, on grounds of value for money and probity.
•
Undertake a strategic review of all NNPC subsidiaries before the PIB passes,
with a view to privatizing, repositioning or scrapping non-performing,
redundant or irrelevant business units.
• Require
a full public report by NNPC of the amount, cost and terms of all cash call
debts; improve reporting of this information to the National Assembly as part
of the annual budget and oversight process.
• Pass an
oil sector transparency law that requires all oil companies active in Nigeria
to report all payments, costs and earnings for each license or transaction, and
to publish all contracts and licenses.
• Create a
special, properly-trained Oil and Gas Sector Financial Crimes Unit for law
enforcement
• Appoint
a new NEITI Board, now long overdue.
Members
should be sector experts with a commitment to transparency, and civil society
should appoint independent representatives.
•
Establish an embedded and independent office of transformation for the sector
with a fixed term and
3 The EFCC
is one government agency with skill sets to develop this specialised area of
law enforcment
specific
mandate to carry through recommendations and transformational reforms accepted
by government.
•
Implement an aggressive debt collection process for outstanding signature bonus
payments; revoke blocks from non-paying firms; sanction those agencies that
failed to collect.
• Conduct
an independent process audit of all upstream cost control rules and mechanisms,
including the use of cross-country price benchmarking.
• Amend
the 1984 Special Tribunal (Miscellaneous Offenses) Act to strengthen the legal
framework for oil theft and other sector crimes.
• Arrest
and prosecute perpetrators and financiers of illegal bunkering rings.
2.
Production
•
Production data for fiscal purposes should be obtained at the flow stations
where crude oil is stabilised and not at the terminals as is currently the
practice.
3.
Domestic Crude Sales
• No
deductions should be made from the amounts payable to the Federation Account.
• Domestic
crude oil should be sold at international competitive prices.
• FGN
should block leakages in the conversion to finished goods process of NNPC.
• There
should be full compliance by NNPC with prevailing CBN exchange rates for
remittance of crude oil proceeds.
• The
Federal Government should revisit the Domestic Crude Oil Business Model
4. Equity
Crude Oil Sales
•
Restructure NNPC for single point accountability for Petroleum Revenues
• National
investment in the oil and gas upstream sector must be managed from a strategic
focal point
• Ensure
full compliance of all agencies and companies with existing legislation
•
Regularise Crude Oil Lifting Under Contract
• Ensure
open competitive selection process for crude oil sales
• Review
the nominations process for all the Joint Ventures
• Ensure
and institute proper review of all draft contractual agreements
• Adequate
funding of the Federation s investment obligations
• Create
standard terms and conditions and uniform terms of contract agreements
• Proper
and realistic budgets and approvals should be prepared annually
• Capacity
Building should be embarked upon for NAPIMS in terms of optimal number and
appropriate skills and training level of staff
• Ensure
uniformity of the realisable prices used by all parties
• Carry
out adequate review of the purchase or lease option for production equipment
5. Sale of
the National Entitlement (Gas)
• Draw up
master agreements for the development of all potential gas reserves in Nigeria
• FGN
should ensure that written consents exist for gas for all assets
• FGN
should intensify efforts to get the other LNG projects up and running
• FGN to
carry out a comprehensive review of its NGL/LPG entitlements under the Agip and
Shell Joint Ventures
6.
Signature Bonus
• The FGN
should expedite action with respect to the blocks in dispute in order to ensure
that the $321million outstanding is collected.
• DPR should
take further actions against the concessionaires that are yet to pay the
amounts due ($167million) within the remit of the law.
• Proper
record keeping should be enforced at the DPR
7.
Concession Rentals
• DPR
should take action and enforce collections of the amounts due of $2.9million
within the remit of the law.
• The DPR
should put in place measures to ensure consistency and accuracy of custodial
information relating to oil and gas concessions
8.
Royalties (Crude Oil and Gas)
• DPR
should take action and enforce collections of the amounts due of $3.027billion
from relevant operators within the remit of the law.
• DPR
should make a demand for the outstanding Addax/NNPC Royalties payments of
approximately $1.5billion on behalf of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the
consequences of default should immediately be visited on the contract and the
relevant parties.
• DPR
should instruct the CBN and operators to ensure the proper description of all
revenue remittances in order to facilitate easy reconciliation.
• DPR
should independently track and record gas production and sales data
• DPR
should ensure that all reconciliation process with all the outstanding gas
producing companies is concluded before the beginning of the next fiscal year.
9. Gas
Flare Penalties
• DPR
should independently track and record gas flare volumes
• The
reconciliation process should be expedited for all operators to ensure timely
collection of the gas flare penalty amounts due.
• DPR
should take action and enforce collections of amounts due as gas flare
penalties within the remit of the law.
• Enforce
the new gas flare penalty directive as a disincentive to gas flaring.
• The FGN
should put more effort in enforcing a zero gas flare policy by the beginning of
the next fiscal year.
10.Miscellaneous
Oil Revenues
• The DPR
should employ the use of proper IT systems and databases to keep its records
and ensure consistency and integrity of information across the organisation.
• The Fee
and Licensing regimes for operating in the Oil and gas sector should be
reviewed to reflect the current economic realities in the Oil and Gas industry
11.Removing
the Source and Outlets of Revenue Losses
• Explore
Fingerprinting of Nigeria Oil to enable tracking.
•
Establishment of a transparent whistle blowing and information portal as an
independent and transparent repository of information on petroleum revenue
losses, sabotage, and illegal activity.
•
Implement a deliberate policy on market ban of participants in crudIe oAil
theftL
• The
Fiscal Responsibility Act 2007 should be amended to criminalize withholding
payment of petroleum revenue after due date and assessment and a notice of
demand.
12.Automation
of the Nigerian Petroleum Industry
1.Department
of Petroleum Resources
• The DPR
should work with Galaxy Backbone and competent consultants to review on-going
projects, NDR and NPMS, and also develop a strategic IT blueprint for the
organization.
• DPR and
MPR should commence the implementation of a portal that aggregates and presents
in real time all relevant information about the operations and performance of
the oil and gas industry.
• An ERP
Solution should be put in place to capture and automate the identified backend
processes in DPR.
• DPR,
based on its mandate should build a Data Warehouse which would serve as a hub
for gathering vital data about the industry and disseminating reports in
various formats to government stakeholders. A framework and implementation
roadmap to full automation of measurement and metering should be developed in a
collective effort involving DPR and the operators with oversight from MPR.
2.Nigerian
National Petroleum Corporation
• The
implementation of SAP should be expedited to fully automate key processes
especially relating to revenue generation, processes feeding and pulling data
to external parties.
• The
NNPC’s culture, end user work ethics and employee resistance to change all need
to be managed extensively for the SAP implementation to be a full success.
• The SAP
implementation should be independently monitored from the Ministry to track and
ensure that the strategic objectives are met.
3.Central
Bank of Nigeria
• A quick
win solution would be to study and automate the NXP forms with a view to track
shipments and track repatriation of export proceeds.
• The
existing CBN systems should be interfaced with other systems in the various
relevant agencies in order to provide an overview of all revenue reporting and
enable timely reconciliation between organizations.
1.Nigeria
Customs Services (NCS)
• The
existing NCS system should be integrated with other systems in the various
relevant agencies in order to provide an overview of all revenue reporting and
enable timely reconciliation between organizations.
1.Full
automation of the Petroleum Industry
The PRSTF
has recommended a way forward for the full automation of the Petroleum
Industry. Key features of the proposed metering and measurement regime in
particular are shown below.
